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A Forgotten British Method? The Rise and Fall of Dialogue between Academics and 
Businessmen 
Abstract: This article aims to understand the process of production of knowledge 
in the field of business organization and in problems of administration. We argue 
that the acquisition of this type of knowledge is greatly assisted by the 
developments of dialogue between academics and industrialists. We look at a 
method which has been applied in England during the period late 1940s to early 
1970s in three academic seminars: The Seminar in Problems of Administration at 
the LSE (1947-1972); The Industrial Seminar at Birmingham University (late 
1950s-1972); and the B.Phil. Seminar in Economics of Industry at the University 
of Oxford (1957-1974). By the mid-1970s, these three seminars ceased to exist 
and left room to the rapid development of management studies, on the one hand, 
and to the formalization of industrial economics (game theory), on the other 
hand.  
Keywords: Management Education, Business Organization, LSE, University of 
Oxford, University of Birmingham, Empirical realism, Seminar method 
Introduction 
Links between universities and businesses have been studied from different 
perspectives, such as universities-industries innovations and research joint-ventures, 
commercialisation of knowledge in universities and academic patenting, the status of 
case-study methods and the role of alumni networks in the dynamics of universities. 
This research contributes to the understanding of these links in the context of early 
attempts to generate dialogue between academics and businessmen, in a process of 
theory-building. In particular, it aims to understand the process of production of 
knowledge in the field of business organization and economics of the firm between 
1940s and 1970s in the UK. The particular feature of this work is that the acquisition of 
this type of knowledge is greatly assisted by the developments of dialogue between 
academics and industrialists, which eased the production of working knowledge in 
business organization and problems of administration.    
 
3 
This key idea is derived from the historical analysis of three early seminars in 
which this dialog took place. In particular, we look at a method which had been applied 
in England during the period late 1940s to early 1970s in the following academic 
seminars: The Seminar in Problems of Administration at the LSE set up and ran by 
Ronald Edwards (1947-1972); The Industrial Seminar at Birmingham University set up 
by Leonard Minkes with Philip Sargant Florence as Chairman (late 1950s-1972); and 
the B.Phil. Seminar in Economics of Industry at the University of Oxford set up by 
Philip W. Andrews and co-chaired with Elizabeth Brunner (1957-1974). By the mid-
1970s, these three seminars ceased to exist and left room to other approaches and 
developments in the studies of firms and industries. To a large extent, although of 
different nature, these three seminars reflected a shared effort to provide an empirical 
approach to the understanding of firms and industries with a particular emphasis on 
industrial structure, business behaviour and decision-making. This form of empiricism 
did not only consist of collecting facts but, rather, showed the importance of exchange 
and dialogues between academics and industrialists which led to a better understanding 
of firms’ decisions, behaviour and dynamics as well as industrial policy. This desire to 
provide a new form of economic analysis which was meant to fit the facts better than 
earlier theories echoes the diffusion of some key ideas and new approaches in the 
discipline: analysis of cost accounting at the LSE, consideration of bounded rationality 
at Birmingham and oligopoly theory and empirical cost functions in Oxford. The 
common denominator between these initiatives was to provide students with working 
knowledge, considered to be mainly absent from previous theories of the firm and of 
industries. More implicitly, it could be seen as a critique of marginal cost as well as 
rational choice theories.       
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In line with its main objective, this article naturally falls into three parts. The 
first part contextualizes the three seminars in the broader tendency of empiricism in 
British economics during the 1930s-1940s period. The second part of the article offers a 
detailed analysis of the rise and fall (1947-1974) of the three seminars based on archival 
sources and on one of the author’s main recollections (especially in relation to the 
seminar in Birmingham). The third and last part of this work discusses the causes of 
these trends and contextualise this method in a more international landscape. The 
emergence of new problems in the course of development of these seminars as well as 
more individual reasons concerned with the chairmen’s own positions and careers are 
discussed as explanations of their interruption.  
Empiricism and British Economics (1930s-1940s) 
There is nothing new nor essentially controversial in the idea of empiricism in the study 
of economics of the firm or of economic behaviour as a whole. Thus, Adam Smith was 
deeply concerned with the acquisition of ‘real’ data; so were other thinkers in the early 
institutionalisation of political economy (cf. Cary (1695) and Petty (1662)). It was as far 
back as the 1830s that the Manchester Statistical Society was founded with the explicit 
intention of advancing empirical knowledge in both the economic and social spheres. 
Alfred Marshall was certainly one of the pioneer economists who initiated the first 
efforts of empirical work conducted in the domain of economics of the firm, of 
industries and business organization. 
Alfred Marshall’s legacy 
Alfred Marshall did attach importance to applied study of economic phenomena, as 
exemplified in the introduction of the new Tripos in Economics at the beginning of the 
20th century. Marshall justified this new undergraduate programme as a preparation for 
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students to enter business life and his aim was to develop more than just a technical 
education in the discipline. Indeed, he remarked:  
“What is desired is not technical instruction, but an education of a high type, which 
shall have the additional advantage of preparing the student to take, without 
unreasonable delay, a responsible place in business or in public life.” (Cambridge 
special committee of the Senate, 6th June 1903, in Marshall, 1903, p. 3).  
Undeniably, businessmen’s opinions did matter in Marshall’s attitude. The new 
Tripos was motivated by Marshall’s fear of seeing the sons of English businessmen sent 
to newer Universities which would potentially offer them a more practical education. 
Marshall’s position towards dialogue with businessmen might echo his stay at 
University College, Bristol, during the period 1877-1881. There, Alfred and Mary 
Marshall, recently married, were teaching students who were less academic than those 
in Cambridge and had consequently adjusted the content of their lectures1. Yet, this 
experience brought Marshall “into the public eye and to a first-hand acquaintance with 
the wider world of affairs” (Whitaker, 1972: 1). On his return to Cambridge, in his 
Introductory Lecture given in the Senate House in 1885, Marshall addressed the needs 
for Universities to be “more in sympathy with business”:  
“[...] if more University men looked upon their life here as preparing them for the 
higher posts of business, what a change they might make in the tone of business! 
Just and noble sentiments might be introduced into counting-house and factory and 
workshop, without the dangers which weak benevolence runs of turning sentiment 
into sentimentality, of courting ruin and increasing the common prejudice that a 
pleasant looking house of business is likely to be financially unsound. If our 
                                                
1 In Marshall’s Outlines of Courses of Lectures on Political Economy Given at University 
College, Bristol, one can read “The lectures will be adapted to the requirements of those 
who have some acquaintance with economic science, or with the practical conduct of 
business” (reproduced in Whitaker, 1972: 44). 
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Universities were more in sympathy with business, charitable England would not 
have left to other countries so much of the work of pioneering the way towards 
making factory life pleasant and beautiful.” (Marshall, 1885, pp. 55-56).  
Marshall’s economics was developed as a combination between theoretical 
elements and empirical facts. Although this early impulsion made by Marshall, 
empirical work did not remain at the heart of the Cambridge School of Economics. 
Marshall’s legacy was soon to become encapsulated within a series of famous debates 
in the 1930s, which mainly dealt with theoretical foundations of costs and economic 
returns and also led to the publication of the Economics of Imperfect Competition by 
Joan Robinson. This Cambridge trend led to a more general critique in the country that 
claimed for the increasing need of empirical approaches in economics.  
Towards empirical approaches to the firm and industry in the UK (1930s-1940s) 
The 1920s-30s debate on the Cambridge Cost Controversies questioned the theoretical 
meaning of Marshall’s work. Through the publication of a series of articles in the 
Economic Journal, a series of challenges were addressed to the evolving ‘Marshallian’ 
orthodoxy and eventually led to the concept of imperfect competition. The starting point 
is the attack against the technical developments of Marshall by Clapham in 1922. In his 
article, Clapham expressed a general doubt, concerning the complexity of Marshall’s 
theory, which tried to combine decreasing returns in an individual firm (in order to 
maintain the hypothesis of perfect competition) with increasing returns at the industrial 
level. He especially disagreed with Marshall’s concept of increasing returns, which he 
considered as an ‘empty box’. Thus, in opposition to a classification of industries on the 
basis of variable returns, Clapham suggested a more historical, descriptive approach, in 
order to get closer to ‘things of life’ (Clapham, 1922: 305). In his reply to Clapham’s 
critique, Pigou (1922) accused Clapham of failing to distinguish between ‘realism’ and 
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‘practical usefulness’. Two years later, Pigou was forced to defend the existing 
orthodoxy (Pigou, Robertson, 1924). Robertson’s criticism of Pigou’s reply to Clapham 
held that Pigou's treatment of the Laws of Return in the Economics of Welfare (1920) 
not only rendered the filling of the empty boxes unnecessarily difficult but also 
positively misleading and dangerous, if they were to be used as a guide for policy 
implementation. To a large extent, these controversies on costs were therefore the first 
attempts to assess the importance of industrial facts, ‘things of life’ and to evaluate the 
realism and practical usefulness of economic theory. Yet, all the debates were centred on 
the theoretical foundations of costs and left very little room to any dialogue with 
businessmen in Cambridge.    
In the newly-established University of Birmingham, the role of William James 
Ashley was more significant in the development of empiricism in economics. Ashley 
took the first Chair of Commerce in 1902 when he oversaw the B.Com. degree as a 
qualification for students who would be entering on business careers. In line with 
Ashley, Philip Sargant Florence, who was Professor of Commerce at Birmingham 
(1929-1955) and who had attended Marshall’s lectures at Cambridge, thought that the 
logic of industrial organization could only be established if there was a basis in the facts 
of industrial behaviour2.  
While the inter-war period in Cambridge was animated by theoretical debates 
which have been later qualified as the years of High Theory, Oxford economists 
                                                
2 Leonard Minkes’ recollection is that he had little patience with the drawing of long-run 
envelope curves, showing economics of scale: yet he was a pioneer in recognizing the 
existence of indivisibilities in factors of production as source of such economies. Oddly, 
however, he saw no limits to scale if appropriate management was achieved. 
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gradually developed a more empirical approach to economics, also in response to 
developments on imperfect competition. This trend was largely supported by two 
institutional developments: The Oxford Economists Research Group (OERG) as well as 
the Oxford Institute of Statistics. The Oxford Institute of Statistics was formally 
established on 22 October 1935 under the direction of the Social Studies Research 
Committee, with J. Marschak appointed as its director3. The OERG was created in 1936 
and as a part of the Oxford Institute of Statistics. Initially led by Sir Hubert Henderson 
(sole Professor of Economics in Oxford), the meetings of the OERG’s studies basically 
consisted of sets of research projects which took about eighteenth months and which 
were based upon questionnaires. These questionnaires were sent in advance and then 
based on after-dinner interviews with businessmen who were invited to come to Oxford 
to dine and spare an evening answering the members’ questions. They had intensive 
discussion and questioning took place from about 8.30 pm until the small hours of the 
morning. All the businessmen were promised complete confidentiality. A record was 
kept of what was said after each meeting, before being sent back to the guest, allowing 
him to alter his comments. A copy was then given to each of the members of the Group 
on condition that it was regarded as strictly confidential to them personally. This 
procedure to study firms in economics was perceived as a completely new methodology 
at the time, and broke with traditional deductive methods4.  
                                                
3 For a further detailed account, see Chester, 1986: 54-55 and Lee and Young, 1993: 120-125. 
4 Interestingly, this research practice was also used by politics fellows during the same period. 
This is evidenced in The History of the University of Oxford: The Twentieth Century. In 
particular, Harrison notes: “In the 1930s, while Henderson’ Economists Research Group 
was entertaining visiting businessmen, politics tutors were entertaining visiting non-
academic speakers in their Public Administration Group” (Harrison, 1994(b): 388-389).  
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What is particular to this article, therefore, is not the idea that the facts matter: 
rather it is the idea of dialogue. We observe that the Seminar process has the capacity to 
focus attention on economic phenomena, such as costs determination and decision-
making processes in face of the reality, which businessmen face and inhabit. It is argued 
that management perception is a statement about reality and that it is important, 
therefore, to focus on the element of managerial perception of industrial phenomena.  
Rise and fall of Three Seminars in Economics of Industry and in Problems of 
Administration (1947-1974) 
This second section of the paper hree seminars based on dialogue between academics 
and businessmen had been organised between the end of the 1940s and the mid-1970s 
in the UK. his second section describes and seeks to understand the rise and fall of these 
three seminars, while it inserts them in a more intellectual and institutional landscape.  
This section is based on primary and secondary sources. First, the examination 
of the LSE seminar relies on R. Edwards’ archives (including seminars papers) that are 
held in the LSE archives. It is also based on the publications of two books (Edwards & 
Townsend, 1958; 1967) that exposed the contents and empirical material discussed in 
the Seminar in Problems of Administration throughout the year. Second, the Industrial 
Seminar (Birmingham) is remembered with the help of Leonard Minkes’ own memories 
as well as his Inaugural Lecture at Birmingham addressed in 1972. It is also based on 
the publication of Minkes & Nuttall (1985) that exposed the discussions that took place 
during the seminar. Last, concerning the Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industry 
(Oxford), the analysis results exclusively from primary sources, such as personal 
archives from participants to the seminar (e.g. David Stout and George Richardson), 
Andrews and Brunner’s archives (LSE), interviews conducted with Oxford dons and 
graduate seminar’s exam questions.    
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Seminar in Problems of Administration (1947-1972), London School of 
Economics 
In 1919, the LSE had the second Chair of Accounting in the country (after Birmingham 
in 1902) and trained a new generation of economic theorists who applied their ideas to 
practical business problems, especially in accounting. In the 1930s, under the leadership 
of Professor Arnold Plant, the London School of Economics (LSE) continued to 
develop a tradition in accounting, commerce and business economics. Plant was an 
applied economist interested by industrial organization and very much concerned with 
empirical observations.  Interestingly, this specific LSE tradition developed intellectual 
foundations far from the orientations taken by another research group led by Lionel 
Robbins which was more interested in pure economic theory and whom members were 
Friedrich Hayek, Knut Wicksell, John Hicks, and Nicholas Kaldor.   
Early members of Plant’s group were Ronald Coase (later a Nobel Laureate in 
Economics), George Thirlby and Ronald Edwards. After a career in professional 
accounting, Edwards was appointed as an assistant lecturer at the LSE in 1935 and 
helped developing the opportunity cost tradition, especially with his analysis of cost 
accounting (Edwards, 1937) and income measurement (Edwards and Black, 1938). In 
his Essays on Economics and Economists, Ronal Coase remembered the significance of 
Plant’s influence and the abilities of Ronald Edwards: 
“So far as I was concerned, perhaps Plant’s main influence was in bringing me to 
see that there were many problems concerning business practices to which we had 
no satisfactory answer. Plant had many able students, among them […] Ronald 
Edwards”. (Coase R.H., 1994, Essays on Economics and Economists, p. 213)   
Edwards’ study of accounting was rooted in economic theory. His interests in 
industrial research, business organisation, business growth and business enterprise led 
him to set up an evening seminar that included businessmen, civil servants, university 
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teachers and postgraduate students. Businessmen’s professional background was 
diverse, such as in science and technology, accountancy, economics, law, marketing and 
personnel management. The rules were as follows: a paper (circulated to its members in 
advance) was prepared by an industrialist, or sometimes a civil servant, for each 
meeting. Based on this preliminary paper, hundreds of discussions took place until 1972 
that lead to “valuable collection of industrial case material”. In their 1958 book, 
Edwards and Townsend summed up the aim of the papers, as such:   
“Many of these papers review the development and organisation of particular 
firms, industrial groups or other undertakings concerned with industry and trade, 
and are presented by company chairmen, managing directors or other senior 
executives” (Edwards & Townsend, 1958, p. vi)   
Members of the Seminar in Problems of Administration mainly used dialog with 
businessmen to bridge the “gap between economic theory and economic fact”. In 
particular, Edwards’ objective was to challenge “fascination of economic analysis and 
model-building” that had attracted a high proportion of the “ablest minds amongst 
economists away from empirical research”. The dialog with industrialists also aimed at 
providing a better understanding of the “actual operations of firms and industries” 
before drawing any of the big issues in industrial organisation. The status of facts vis-à-
vis economic theory is not that clear when scrutinizing the seminar papers. On the one 
hand, the seminar ambitioned to discover “facts that the theories have to explain and 
predict”, so that “economic analysis can also be the study of business activity”. On the 
other hand, the aim was to test economic theories. In their book, Edwards and 
Townsend argued: “Sound economic theories are a prerequisite of useful empirical 
research, but they are sterile unless they are tested against the actual facts of the 
economy”.  
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Overall, the collection of data based on the seminar papers and the two books is, 
most of all, used to infer theory from factual observations. Theory-testing is almost 
absent from the analysis. And at the end, topics are so varied that there is no common 
theme/ theoretical background, beyond industrial organisation, unifying dialogs of 
businessmen.   
Yet, if the uniformity in the program underlined by the LSE seminar in problems 
of administration is discussable, it still inspired other seminars of the same type, as 
shown in the two following sections.  
Industrial Seminar (Late 1950s-1972), Birmingham University 
Leonard Minkes arrived at Birmingham in 1954 after being a young member of 
academic staff at the LSE. He was motivated by the experience of the Edwards Seminar 
and the possibility of benefiting from the skills and reputation of Philip Sargant 
Florence who was approaching retirement from the Chair of Commerce to develop a 
seminar based on a dialog with industrialists in the Birmingham region. As highlighted 
in the first section of this paper, Birmingham had a long tradition in applied economics 
mainly based on its Faculty of Commerce created in 1902. Philip Sargant Florence who 
was first a Lecturer in Economics at Cambridge (1921) became the Professor of 
Commerce at Birmingham in 1929. His main research interests were in economics and 
sociology of industry and more specifically in the issues of ownership and control in 
large companies. Sargant Florence had developed particular interest in detailed 
statistical information and in the development of ‘economics and human behaviour’5. 
                                                
5 More details about the academic career and the economic thought of Philip Sargant Florence 
could be found in Minkes (2011) and Arena (2014).  
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To a large extent, his view of economics contrasted with the approaches developed by 
standard British economists in these days. He continually challenged methods used by 
economists, as explicitly stated in the following: 
“The unaided reason of economists cannot possibly cope with the infinite 
possibilities of man’s behaviour; economists must continually take precautions 
against rational assumptions by the teaching of fairy-tales, nursery rhymes, and 
nonsense jingles”. (Sargant Florence P., 1927)  
Based on the initiative of Leonard Minkes, Philip Sargant Florence became 
Chair of the newly formed Industrial Seminar in the late 1950s. This initiative was taken 
in an institutional context where management education was emerging at Birmingham. 
Minkes, recognising the growing interest in University management education in 
England, expressed an interest and willingness to build up appropriate and continuing 
systems with industrialists. Along with other supporters of this initiative (such as 
Professor Gilbert Walker), Minkes also established two other seminars: one for private, 
one for nationalised industries in which younger executives spent one day a week in 
academic study.  
 The Industrial Seminar consisted of an evening seminar held on ten 
occasions every year and attended by about 60 people (of whom 2/3 from industry). The 
visitor from the company submitted a paper in advance (in which he described the 
development of his company), which was the basis for further discussion. The main 
issues discussed during the sessions were concerned with organisational change and 
process, growth of firms, strategic choice, entrepreneurship, management initiative and 
decision-making. The content and main discussions conducted during the seminars had 
been accounted in Minkes and Nuttall’s book which was published almost ten years 
after the end of the seminar. The specificity of the dialog as a method to produce 
knowledge is made explicit by the authors:   	
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“The methodology of the book is to present case material interspersed with 
commentary. This material does not comprise case studies in quite the sense of the 
conventional workbook: it may better be described, perhaps, as case evidence. Its 
origin is an interesting example of the way in which ideas can be stimulated and 
research generated by exchange between industrialists and academics” (Minkes & 
Nuttall, 1985)    
Beyond providing case evidence, the objective of the seminar was more specific 
than the one put by Edwards at the LSE. The seminar was seen as a way to provide 
insights for a better understanding of “business behaviour” and “business strategy”. In 
line with the Birmingham tradition, the dialog stimulated by the seminar aimed at 
showing how business strategy could emerge in the “large and complex modern 
corporation with its network of hierarchical and lateral forms”. Much more precise than 
the LSE seminar framework of dialogue, the Industrial Seminar developed a detailed 
conceptual framework concerned with behavioural and organisational theories of the 
firm. In particular, the key idea was to draw “critical reality” to current theoretical 
considerations in decision-making analysis taken in a world in which “knowledge is 
incomplete, imperfect and dispersed”. The reference to decision-making was of 
particular interest especially as to understand decisions underlying the corporate 
behaviour. Brian Loasby has expressed the view that, at the time, micro-economic 
theory has little to tell us about the nature of decision-processes in firms6. He 
commented that his studies of industrial location, early in his career, led him to go and 
talk to businessmen about their experiences of relocation – which in turn led him to 
realise that ‘decision-making’ was an important and analysable topic7.  
                                                
6 Recent personal correspondance with Brian Loasby.  
7 Loasby was a research fellow at Birmingham University for several years, studying location of 
industry, early in his career. He attended a number of meetings of the Industrial Seminars 
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A further point which emerged and which appeared in a number of Seminar 
papers, is the inseparability of strategic choice of product-market scope from creation of 
corporate structure. What was also taken into account was that the study of managerial 
decision-making was intimately associated with the study of corporate structure as well 
as with the behaviour of the individual executive8. That is well-exemplified in Simon’s 
proposition that the executive in an organization looks at his decisions not only 
specifically, but also in relation to their organisational consequences. This 
interrelatedness has explicit consequences for the consideration of centralisation and 
decentralisation in business enterprises, as we can see in looking at some of the Seminar 
papers. And the empirical approach, especially in conversational dialogue, focuses 
attention not as the ‘mental construct’ as Machlup termed it, but as an organisational 
structure (as e.g. Tivey envisaged in his book ‘The Politics of the Firm’ or as Ross 
wrote a field of constructive conflict)9. 
Yet, in this conceptual framework, there was no clear desire to make 
generalisations from studies of firms and their decisions but rather to favour the 
emergence of ‘recurring themes’ in one dialog after another.  Put differently, the 
collection of data based on the seminar papers and the book was mostly used for case 
evidence that could enrich an initial conceptual framework (such as H. Simon’s 
developments on decision-making for instance). In line with the Seminar in Problems of 
Administration, theory-testing was not ambitioned in the organization of this seminar. 
                                                
– of which it is only fair to say, he has no detailed recollection, but exemplifies his 
growing interest in decision-making and conversation with businessmen. 
8 Ansoff separates strategic and administrative decisions. They are, of course, intimately 
associated.   
9 Tivey in political science, Ross in industrial relations: both attended the Birmingham seminar, 
as did Geoffrey Gilbert, from the Chemistry department.  
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To a large extent, case evidence could also serve business history which in turn could 
serve the understanding of step-by-step decision-making process (including 
coincidences and contingencies familiar to decision-makers).   
Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industry (1956-1974), University of Oxford  
In Oxford, the weekly graduate (B.Phil.) seminar in the economics of industry 
illustrates substantial theoretical and empirical developments in empirical industrial 
economics during the period 1952-1968. The B.Phil. in Economics has only been 
introduced since the War, and it originally offered students a choice between one 
compulsory theoretical and one compulsory Applied Economics paper.10 Two advanced 
papers could then be chosen in addition to the compulsory ones, but these were mainly 
traditional topics, such as international trade or statistics (Brunner, 1961: 1-2). These 
seminars gave a new opportunity for the B.Phil students to become more specialised in 
the topics they were really interested in. One of the senior and most popular seminars 
among students was the two-year graduate seminar in Applied Economics. The first 
sessions of the seminar did not seem to be very attractive, and “made a very shaky start 
[...] with only two people apart from seniors at the first meeting” (Brunner, 1961: 3). 
However, the attendance rapidly grew to 12 members. It was run by Sir Hubert 
                                                
10 As Elizabeth Brunner rightly pointed out, ‘there was no formal teaching of graduates at 
Oxford until after the War. Until 1947, if you wanted to read a higher degree you wrote a 
thesis and submitted it for either a B.Litt. [2 years, research report] or a D.Phil. [up to 4 
years, originality and worthy of publication]. […] After the War, it became clear that 
graduate work at Oxford was going to be greatly expanded. People were demanding to 
find some organization. […] And Oxford introduced a new graduate degree, the B.Phil., 
equivalent to the B.Litt. in standing but to be taken by examination not thesis and to be 
taught by class instruction. B.Phil. for 2 years (exceptionally 1) primarily for Philosophy, 
Economics and History.’ (Brunner, 1961: 2) 
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Henderson, Sir Henry Clay, Frank Burchardt and Philip Andrews. The seminar used to 
meet every Monday at 5pm at the Oxford Institute of Statistics and covered a very wide 
field, not only the firm and industries but also national income, employment, and 
macro-economic topics11. Henderson’s role in the seminar was central. When he died, 
Worswick took his place, which caused the seminar to be split in two parts in 1956. 
Balogh was in charge of the public policy/budget angle and Andrews took the 
economics of industries part. Each speciality became a year’s course only and the 
seminars were both held at the same time. Andrews re-organised it as a specialised 
seminar in industrial economics. In a letter to one of the businessmen he invited in the 
early days of the seminar, he wrote:  
“There was some left-wing manoeuvring in the summer which gave me a chance, 
much to their surprise, to convert the seminar into something much more 
systematic and I think offering better value.” (Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to David 
Liston, The Metal Box Company, 10/01/1957, Andrews and Brunner’s Archives, 
LSE library) 
Andrews was running the seminar with Elizabeth Brunner, Eric Hargreaves, and 
Dr. Burchardt who was the Director of the Institute of Statistics. The sessions of this 
new seminar took place in Nuffield every Monday at 5pm. The entry was limited to 
twelve members, all graduates interested in the economics of the firm and the 
economics of industry. During the first term of the session, the group had no visitor and 
each member learnt to know others by reading literature bearing on practice in industry 
and discussing practical evidence on particular topics, stressing their implication for 
theory. For the remaining two terms of the academic year, the seminar invited visitors to 
                                                
11 Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to David Liston, The Metal Box Company, 10/01/1957, 
Andrews and Brunner’s archives: Box 529  
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enlighten the group from their own practical experience. Each session was opened by a 
graduate member who had to read a short paper on questions relevant to the seminar, 
before setting them against the background of generally accepted theory. The 
organisation of the sessions was very different to the other seminars of the time. As E. 
Brunner remarked: 
“The course of other seminars is that someone reads a lengthy paper, the senior 
members then hold forth, and there is no real discussion. We have aimed at short 
papers and real discussions” (Brunner, 1961: 3)  
The guest was first asked to give a brief description of his business and its 
products, to thereafter comment on the paper from the point of view of his experience, 
before a general discussion followed12.  
The topics selected in the seminar were diverse. For example, in Michaelmas 
Term 1958, five main enquiries, in line with the purpose of industrial economics, were 
studied: ‘the behaviour of costs’, ‘the competitive process’, ‘barriers to new 
competition’, ‘innovation’ and ‘restrictive trade practices’. In later terms, these 
theoretical analyses were completed by the discourse of a ‘practical guest’, such as: 
‘businessman who had marketed an innovation’, ‘pricing policies for different sort of 
products’, ‘businessman on deciding the scale of a plant’, and ‘cotton industry after 
giving up price fixing’ (Brunner, 1961: 5). The organisation of the seminar was 
implemented during the first term around theoretical discussions, in order to give more 
sense to the scope of the questionnaires, which were sent in later.  
When Andrews and Brunner left Oxford in 1968, David Stout was left in charge 
of the B.Phil. seminar in industrial economics and, he in turn, left Oxford in the early 
                                                
12 Different Oxfordshire businessmen were speaking at this seminar every week. 
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1970s, losing touch with its organisation in 1974. Then Derek Morris became its 
organiser and reoriented the topics in a different direction. A closer look at the reading 
lists for each topic (per week) mentioned above shows that the reading list for Week 2 
includes references to Berle and Means, Marris and Williamson, as contributions to the 
extensions of the profit maximising hypothesis, without referring at all to Hall and 
Hitch or to any work made by empirical approaches developed by the OERG in 
Oxford13.  
The use of dialog between academics and industrialists is rather different in the 
Oxford context than in the LSE and Birmingham seminars. It is clear from archival 
evidence that what Andrews had in mind was to use real facts related by businessmen to 
challenge deductive and normative approaches in industrial economics.  
Discussion  
The interpretation of the emergence, rise and fall of these three seminars is based on 
three types of analysis. First, we contextualise these methodological initiatives in a 
broader international context and show that these seminars were representative of a 
more general tendency towards a form of empirical realism in the 1960s. Second, we 
provide a more analytical explanation of the seminars in assessing the evolution of the 
Oxford seminar in Economics of Industries. A text analysis is used to scrutinize the 
content of the seminars papers and their evolution on the period. Last but not least, 
causes of interruption due to the emergence of new problems are exposed.      
                                                
13 Further details about this new orientation of the seminar could be found in section 2, part 3 of 
this article.  
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Some international comparisons 
More generally, these three seminars are representative of a more global tendency 
worldwide in the 1960s developments in economics of the firm and of industries. Three 
comparative examples could be given here. In Sweden first, the importance for academics 
to understand real business problems is a characteristic of the post-war period. In 1962, 
while recruiting a chair in managerial economics, Ulf af Trolle, professor at Lund 
University, regretted that “the tendency [he had] noticed to construct ideas about the 
commercial life from the depths of our minds, instead of going out and seeing what things 
actually look like” (Engwall, 2009, p. 89). Interestingly, this desire towards more 
empirical studies in business administration and managerial economics was balanced by 
the importance of theoretical foundations, when Sune Carlson, another senior scholar at 
Lund, established selection criteria of recruitment that included “1) a command of 
microeconomic theory in the applicant’s particular field, 2) an understanding of 
microeconomic theory in relation to the setting within which firms work, 3) evidence of 
good knowledge of the internal and external data available for the scientific illustration 
of business administration problems”[Engwall, 2009, p. 90, italics added].  
These 1960s initiatives towards empirical realism also took place in German’s approaches 
to economics of firms and business administration which enabled students and future 
managers to acquire specialist competences – seen as foundations of the German 
alternative to American managerialism in the governance of firms (Locke, 1989). The 
training of business economists and more indirectly the orientation taken by equivalent 
research in the field was strongly criticised, since it was claimed that “business 
economists [were] obviously not willing to measure the achievement of their discipline 
in terms of innovative, convincing solutions and methods developed for practical 
problems. Instead, everything has to serve an abstract academic ideal (Dichgans, 1965, 
pp. 70-1, in Kipping, 1998, p. 98, italics added). In this context, the Baden-Baden 
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seminars organised in 1951-1952 sought to contribute to this cause, yet organizing this 
dialogue outside the University and with the help of the Federation of German Industry, 
unlike the three seminars discussed in the context of this article.  
In the US, while there was a long tradition of case studies-based methods initiated by 
Harvard University, dialogues took rather place between businessmen rather than 
between academics and businessmen. This is exemplified by the organization of short 
Industrial Management Seminars where American managers acquainted large groups of 
businessmen with the latest managerial know-how from the United-States (Kipping and 
Nioche, 1997). Yet, because of the debate developed below between the Chicago and 
the Harvard traditions, the American context did not leave much room for such 
dialogues. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that these British initiatives had been 
imported to some American Universities. The archives evidence, for instance, the 
organization of a graduate seminar in Economics of Industries “on the same lines as the 
Oxford Graduate Seminar in the same subject”, but with American businessmen in 
Winter 1963 (Andrews, 1963, p. 1). 
An illustration of the seminars’ evolution: A text analysis of the Oxford B.Phil. 
seminar’s papers 
To illustrate the evolution of the seminars, one might be interested to zoom in the 
evolution of seminars’ papers in the Oxford Seminar in Economics of Industries between 
1956 and 1974. The list of all Oxford seminars that are accessible in the archives at the 
Bodleian and that were kindly given to us by Prof. David Stout - after having scanned 
them - were imported in Atlas.Ti and are reproduced in Table 1 (see appendix). Overall, 
this data set consists of a list of 76 seminars titles between Michaelmas Term 1956 and 
Michaelmas Term 1974, noting that the archives do not include any between 1969 and 
1973. These titles have been complemented by the content of 14 scanned papers (out of 
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the 76 titles) of approximately 10 pages each written by some participants to the seminars. 
These archives are scattered and incomplete, which makes difficult to conduct a 
systematic qualitative analysis. Yet, given these restrictions, the results of the text 
analysis are twofold.  
First, regarding the contents of the papers accessible and that cover the period 1958-1966. 
Terms’ occurrences clearly show the conceptual orientation taken by the Oxford seminar. 
The development of a theory of the firm which was either absent or a part of the theory 
of value in earlier economic theories has now been clearly developed. The term “firms” 
or “firm” is ranked first among economic concepts occurring in the documents. 
Interestingly, while the term “firms” or “firm” occur 291 times over the 14 seminars 
papers; the term “producers” or “producer” only appear 20 times while “supplier” or 
“suppliers” just appear 2 times. This strongly supports the idea that this new approach to 
the firm consisted of a shift in economic analysis, since it moved away from both marginal 
cost and rational choice theories in which the only account of a firm was a representative 
producer. The significance of the analysis of “costs” is also materialised by its second 
rank of occurrence. The high occurrence of the term “growth” shows the importance to 
discuss a dynamic understanding of the firm, outside the static view developed by earlier 
economic theories, in which size was preferred to growth.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Interestingly, these significant occurrences exist in contrast with some less cited 
economic concepts such as “theory” only used 25 times overall and “marginal” only used 
29 times. On the period, the evolution of the use of these recurrent terms is not significant 
enough to be discussed here and to show a disappearance or an emergence of terms.  
Still, while comparing the terms used in the 76 titles of the seminars, we introduce two 
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main codes in which we gather several terms that indicate the desire to inject empirical 
realism in economic analysis: “industrial case studies” (including for example topics such 
as “shoe industry”, “oil transport”, “retail trade”, etc.) and “practical economic concepts” 
(including for example concepts such as “workable competition” and “empirical cost-
functions”). Results are exposed here.  
[Insert Graph 1 here] 
What the analysis shows is a decrease of both categories between 1956 and 1974, and 
more importantly the absence of any industrial case studies from 1962 onwards. As shown 
in Table 2, the term “game theory” appears for the first time in 1974, after Andrews left 
Oxford in 1968 and while chaired by Derek Morris.   
Causes of decline and emergence of new problems 
By the mid-1970s, these seminars ceased to exist. It is not relevant to look for critical 
arguments and controversies inside the seminars. This is due to two main factors. First, 
except in the Oxford case, the chairman has always been the same scholar (R. Edwards 
at the LSE, PS. Florence and L. Minkes at Birmingham). Consequently, to a large extent, 
genuine controversies did not take place. Within the seminars, there was no real room for 
the development of alternative approaches, as people invited were from the same vein as 
the organizers. Even the books which have been published as a result of these seminars 
are co-authored by their chairmen, respectively.  
Yet, we provide four main alternative causes that could explain this interruption. Some 
are concerned with internal causes (due to chairmen’s lives and institutional academic 
environment); while others result from external changes, in particular the diffusion of 
game theory as well as the developments of neo-liberal economic policies.   
Internal causes due to individual factors related to the chairmen’s lives and careers and 
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their academic environment - There are first personality reasons and career explanations 
which are inherent to the specific institutional context in which each seminar took place. 
For instance, in Oxford, Andrews’ and Brunner’s attitude – which combined ahistorical 
empirically-oriented studies based on questionnaires addressed to contemporary 
businessmen with an explicit rejection of any collaboration with scholars invested in 
Oxford business studies – did not help to defend the initial tradition initiated by the OERG 
outside the traditional frame of perfect versus imperfect competition. In Birmingham, 
Leonard Minkes moved away from the organization of the Industrial Seminar when 
helped settling management education with the opening of the Graduate Centre for 
Management Studies (1966). To a large extent, these reasons for decline look similar to 
the case of Harvard and what Lazonick (1998) called “the neo-classical vision of the 
market and the firm” which resulted from the inability of Harvard economists and 
economic historians trained in the Schumpeterian tradition to develop a complete 
alternative view. The Harvard example has some parallels with these cases since as 
Lazonick noted, the old guard of the non-mainstream scholarship “exited to spend their 
time in administrative positions, research institutes, or professional schools” (Ibid.: 290). 
To a large extent, Andrews’ and Brunner’s move to Lancaster echoes Lazonick’s 
contention that the “exit” of scholars who could have had a voice at Harvard played a role 
in the emergent dominance of more mainstream theoretical contributions. These three 
seminars’ dying-out could therefore be interpreted as “failure of intellectual influence” 
rather than “a failure of intellectual achievement” (Lazonick, 1998: 291). No doubt that 
the interruption of the three seminars also resulted from an absence of potential successors 
to the initial chairmen. It would be worth noting, that in both Oxford and LSE, these 
seminars were at the periphery of other scientific activities led in the economics 
department. Andrews’ tense relationship with Hicks made him rather marginal and might 
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explain his departure to Lancaster. At the LSE, Edwards’ group was marginalised by 
Robbin’s department which was seen as more theoretical and rigorous, as it gathered 
Hayek and Kaldor.   
External causes due to the emergence and the diffusion of game theory in the field of 
industrial organization, especially in the US  
 To put things in a nutshell, the emergence of game theory is a post WWII American 
development based on the formal construction and diffusion of tools applied to economic 
analysis (see in particular the successive contributions of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, Nash, Selten, Harsanyi and Aumann). This first period of emergence was 
followed by a second period at the beginning of the 1970s-game theory was imported to 
economic theory, which led to new advances in the field of industrial organization. 
Giocoli (2008) refers to the famous controversy between the Chicago and the Harvard 
traditions. At the time, game theorists brought new perspectives and changed the nature 
of the main developments mainly encapsulated in imperfect competition, that founded 
until then, both Harvard and Chicago traditions. This intrusion of game theory in 
economic theory was soon to appear in France (Arena, Dutraive, 2016), as well as in the 
UK.  
In particular, the import of game theory initiated in the US in British economics of 
industries and business administration is exemplified, when one compares the successive 
editions of the landmark textbook on industrial economics first published in 1979 by Hay 
and Morris. The textbook served as a basis for teaching even decades after its publication 
all around Europe. The first edition aimed at defining industrial economics as a subject, 
emphasising disagreements on both theoretical and empirical issues and the confusion 
over the scope, concepts and methodology in the field. While Hay and Morris’ approach 
to firms and industries rejected standard economic theory; their contribution to the subject 
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still constituted a break away from the Oxford empirical tradition, as shaped by the 
Seminar in Economics of Industries. This judgment is reinforced by comparing the first 
edition (1979) with the second edition, published in 1991, under a slightly different title 
(Industrial Economics and Organisation – Theory and Evidence).  The first edition of 
Industrial Economics – Theory and Evidence referred only twice to Andrews’ normal 
cost theory. As regards Marshall, Hay and Morris adopted a very cautious approach, their 
references to him being limited to their historical introduction to the textbook. They 
argued that Post-Marshallians have lost a part of Marshall’s message in dedicating too 
much work to purely empirical studies. The main difference between the first and the 
second editions lies in the ebbing of controversy within the field of industrial organization 
between 1979 and 1991, mainly because of the increasing domination of game theory in 
the theory of imperfect competition and strategic interaction. Interestingly, the change in 
title between the two successive editions did not merit comment or explanation from the 
authors. However, the second edition indicated a shift away from empirical studies 
towards formalization, which had initially emerged in the United States.  
Causes due to the rise of neo-liberal approaches and the emergence of business studies 
in the UK  
On a different front, the 1970s are often associated with the emergence of neo-liberalism, 
resulting from the elections of R. Reagan in the US and M. Thatcher in the UK. 
Characteristics of this emergence have been largely studied elsewhere (Harvey, 2007) 
and do not need to be recounted here, since neo-liberalism per se did not exert a direct 
analytical influence on the death of our three seminars. Yet, economic policy debates that 
followed this emergence were particularly concerned with competition policies. Hence, 
this directly impacted the orientation of industrial organization, which dealt less and less 
with business behaviours and practices in a specific industry and increasingly on the 
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nature of national industrial policies, especially at an inter-industrial level. As a result, 
the diffusion of neo-liberal policies indirectly fostered the methodological and conceptual 
orientation of industrial organization that gradually moved away from the forms of 
thought initiated in the Oxford and LSE seminars. The development of business studies 
also contributed to this decline.  
The study of firms and industries based on the collection of business and industrial facts, 
as conducted in the three seminars, soon became the topic of a separate academic 
discipline which first emerged in the 1960s and became increasingly prevalent in the UK 
from the 1970s onwards. The need to implement business studies and to import 
management education from the US was strongly influenced by the American graduate 
schools of business administration. These developments sparked off a controversy over 
the legitimacy of university involvement in management education and led the whole 
subject to become a matter for public debate. An increasing number of British 
businessmen gathered to establish the Foundation for Management Education (FME)14. 
Far from impressed by the FME’s developments, some other industrialists, met 
informally at the Savoy Hotel in London to work on the creation of a “British Harvard”15 
calling themselves the Savoy Group (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). These 
                                                
14 The FME financed the establishment of London and Manchester Business School, a few years 
later. The FME still exists and seeks to encourage business leaders to make the transition 
between the private sector and business school academia. For further details on this institution: 
http://management-education.org.uk 
15 The members of the Savoy Group differed from the FME’s work, mainly because their main 
idea was in favour of the need for a ‘completely new type of college which would be tailor-
made to fit industry’s requirements’, created independently from any existing structures 
(Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). 
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establishments were soon followed by the creation in 1961 of the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) to reconcile trade-unions, industry, and government, as a 
response to England’s economic and social decline (Locke, 1996: 46). Two years after its 
creation, this Council reported the need for “at least one very high-level new school or 
institute, along the lines of the Harvard Business School, or the School of Industrial 
Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (NEDC report, 1963: 5-6). 
From this conclusion, the FME, the Savoy Group and the NEDC appointed a Committee, 
led by Lord Franks, which sought to provide detailed recommendations about the 
implementation of these new schools of business in the UK. Lord Franks’ enquiry was 
made easier by the conclusions drawn from the Robbins report a month earlier, which 
suggested that “two major post-graduate schools should be built up in addition to other 
developments already probable in universities and other institutions” (Robbins, 1963: 
65).  
Whereas the Edwards’ seminar was probably less concerned with this cause, the decline 
of the Oxford and the Birmingham ones are clearly impacted by this trend. While in 
Oxford, business studies had to undergo a long drawn-out process of negotiation, it is as 
late as the early 1960s that the first courses in management can be found. Rather than any 
explicit choices by its administrative and academic office, what was instrumental to this 
initial resistance to management studies as a separate discipline, was a combination of 
the university’s overall elitist and traditional outlook, anxieties about infringing on 
traditional disciplinary boundaries and skepticism about business studies in particular. 
Yet, the emergence of business studies in Oxford was not unfamiliar with the dialogue 
method initiated by Andrews’ industrial economics. The B.Phil. in management studies 
ran for the first time in 1967, after many years of discussions and negotiations among the 
different members of the Economics Faculty (Arena, 2010). A controversy emerged 
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between, on the one hand, Norman Leyland – main instigator of the project, who was in 
favour of a combination of industrial economics and business studies – and Philip 
Andrews, on the other, who refused to be associated with this new discipline. The 24th 
January 1966, Philip Andrews, Elizabeth Brunner, David Stout and Lady Margaret Hall 
jointly commented on the ‘proposed use of the economics B.Phil. paper in economics of 
industries in the management studies B.Phil’16. The authors of these comments suggested 
that:  
“[...] the paper [in Economics of Industry] as at present taught is not likely to be a suitable 
regular option for management studies candidates, and that to cater for an extension 
of its use in that way would be likely to damage the work at present being done in the 
existing seminar”. 
They provided different reasons supporting this idea17. If we exclude personal reasons 
mainly concerned with the poor quality of the relationship between Andrews and Leyland 
at the time, alternative explanations of this strong protest about including the economics 
of industry paper in the B.Phil. in management studies can be drawn. Andrews made clear 
on several occasions in his correspondence that he was not opposed to the development 
                                                
16 Andrews and Brunner’s archives, LSE, Box 258. 
17 For instance, lack of knowledge in economics from students in Management Studies (“The 
membership has generally included only men of fairly good quality as economists”), 
confidence issues with businessmen which could arise from the introduction of new people, 
general incompatibility between the aims of the B.Phil. in Management Studies and the 
purpose of the Seminar, library related issues, and so on.  
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of management studies in Oxford18. Still, his arguments could be analysed as real fear 
regarding the future orientation of industrial economics in Oxford. When, seven years 
before, Elizabeth Brunner described the birth of industrial economics in Oxford, she 
already stressed the risk for industrial economics to be confused with management 
studies:  
“Let us hope that the name [of Industrial Economics] does not become too popular and 
dwindle into a synonym for Management Studies” (Brunner, 1961). 
In Birmingham, Leonard Minkes was elected Professor in 1972 and got the Chair in 
Business Organization. He then became a leading individual in Birmingham and helped 
settling management education with the opening of the Graduate Centre for Management 
Studies (1966). which was a joint enterprise of the Universities of Birmingham and Aston 
and which was considered only as an episode since it lasted for approximately eight years 
before leading to two separate business schools (Minkes, 2011(b)). When this venture 
was terminated, Minkes went back to the Faculty of Commerce and Social Science at 
Birmingham and became Dean for the normal 3-year period, which made impossible to 
keep running the seminars. To our knowledge, nothing similar was done at Aston. To 
Minkes, at the time, the seminar method could be regarded intellectually as forerunner in 
the development of University Schools of business.  
Conclusion 
Overall, this contribution does not claim that the seminar method was the sole 
means of empirical study – nor that empiricism or empirical realism is the only road to 
understanding. Yet, the three seminars described in this article shared the particularity 
                                                
18 “[...] But that does not mean that I am to be treated as a person hostile to management 
education.” (Ibid: 4). 
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to develop a then novel form of dialog with businessmen which never emerged before 
in economics. Nevertheless, the three seminars did not assign the same status to 
empirical facts and to dialog with industrialists in their process of production of 
knowledge. Overall, while the Seminar in Problems of Administration (LSE) and the 
Industrial Seminar (Birmingham) aimed at providing a better understanding of “actual 
operations of firms and industries” in the first case and of “business behaviour” in the 
second, the Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industry used dialogue and facts to 
provide theory-testing and to challenge traditional theories of the firm. Then, the first 
two seminars strongly shared the desire to bridge the gap between economic theory and 
economic facts. As shown earlier, the Birmingham Industrial Seminar was narrower in 
terms of topics, as it essentially targeted behavioural and organisational theories of the 
firm and was largely interested to draw “critical reality” to current theoretical 
considerations in decision-making analysis.   
The interruption of this seminar (dialogue) method resulted from the evolution 
of economic thought and methodology at the time. As shown in this paper, the context 
of thought in which these seminars evolved was a transitional period of analytical 
uncertainty between two periods of ‘high theory’: 1. the Marshallian legacy 
encapsulated in the ‘cost controversies’ debates in Cambridge which lasted between the 
mid-1920s and the beginning of the 1930s and 2. the emergence of systematic 
applications of game theory to industrial organisation mainly in the US by the critics 
addressed to the general equilibrium research program (see the so-called “DMS 
(Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein) theorem” in the 1970s). This contribution showed that 
the method of research used in the seminars echoes a) a difficulty for academics to use 
standard economic theory, since they believed that earlier theories were not fitted to the 
study of industrial structure and business practices; b) a difficulty for academics to 
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produce an alternative integrative research program in a situation where, to use Sylos-
Labini ‘s own terms, microeconomic theory was in a “fluid, not to say, chaotic state” 
(Sylos-Labini, 1962). Although it would be misleading to stress a homogenous and 
coordinated research program between these three seminars for the reasons we already 
stressed. Prevalently, methodological discussion did not exclude however debates 
related to the emergence and the meaning of some analytical concepts in each respective 
academic community.  
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